Power and contestation in collaborative ecosystem-based management:The case of Haida Gwaii by Takeda, Louise & Røpke, Inge
Louise Takeda & Inge Røpke


Power and Contestation in Collaborative Ecosystem-based Management:
The Case of Haida Gwaii

Louise Takeda,a​[1]​ Inge Røpkeb

a Aalborg University, Fibigerstraede 2, 9220 Aalborg East, Denmark. ltakeda@socant.net
b Technical University of Denmark, Produktionstorvet, Bld 424, 2800 Kgs. Lyngby, Denmark. inro@man.dtu.dk

Abstract
The depletion of old-growth forests on Haida Gwaii as a result of decades of excessive logging poses a looming threat not only to irreplaceable biodiversity and habitat values but also to the indigenous Haida culture. This study examines the latest stages of a long-running conflict over the forests of Haida Gwaii, and the provincial government’s attempt to ameliorate it through collaborative ecosystem-based land use planning. In contrast to previous studies that have tended to regard collaborative planning processes in terms of either an idealised win-win outcome or the unavoidable government co-optation of opposition, this article explores both the problematic power relations found within the collaborative planning process as well as the opportunities presented by it to expand collective power and more effectively resist oppression and domination.
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1. Introduction

Haida Gwaii, homeland of the Haida Nation, contains some of the richest natural, cultural and political landscapes in the world. Located on the very edge of western Canada this isolated archipelago, colonially known as the Queen Charlotte Islands, is home to some of the world’s last remaining tracts of intact coastal temperate rainforest and is a globally significant repository for biological diversity. However, as a result of accelerated industrial forestry over the past sixty years, the depletion of old-growth forests poses a looming threat to not only the irreplaceable biodiversity and habitat values, but also the indigenous Haida culture. In response, over the past thirty years the Haida people together with environmental and community activists on Haida Gwaii have launched petitions, protests, blockades and lawsuits to demand reductions to logging while pressing for greater local control through community-based forest tenures. The latest stages of this conflict and the provincial government’s attempt to ameliorate it through collaborative, ecosystem-based planning is the focus of this article.  

In contrast to other studies that have tended to regard collaborative processes in terms of either an idealised win-win outcome or the unavoidable government co-optation of opposition, this article explores both the problematic power relations within the collaborative ecosystem-based planning process as well as the potential for such processes to expand collective power that might be used to resist oppression and domination.  

Primary data for the study was collected during three research trips to Haida Gwaii between 2004 and 2005 at which time direct observation of the community planning forum was carried out and interviews with twenty-one participants were conducted. In addition, a wide range of documentation was examined including meeting agendas, minutes, presentations, commissioned studies, official reports, agreements, and the local newspaper.​[2]​ 

In order to appreciate the operation and effects of power, the article begins with a conceptual framework for understanding power. It then briefly reviews the historical background and more recent political and socio-economic context of the conflict before turning to the events surrounding the collaborative land use planning process. The study aims to provide insights into the potential or inability for collaborative planning processes to challenge the structural bases of oppression, while also striving to provide a broader political ecological record of recent events on Haida Gwaii.

2. The Nature of Power
 
A useful starting point for understanding the dynamics of power is the tension between the perspectives of consensus and conflict. These contrasting perspectives illuminate different facets of power which can be clearly seen to play out in the study. The difference between the two approaches has been described as “the tension between the normative and the real, between what should be done and what is actually done” (Flyvbjerg 2001:88). While the roots of the debate can be traced back to the contrasting perspectives of Hobbes and Machiavelli, the tension continues in the discourse ethics of Jürgen Habermas and the power analytics of Michel Foucault.

Habermas has been described as “the philosopher of morality” whose efforts centred on the study of processes for establishing consensus as a way of dealing with power (Ibid.). Central to Habermas’ approach is the concept of communicative rationality described as “a noncoercively unifying, consensus-building force of a discourse in which the participants overcome their at first subjectively biased views in favour of a rationally motivated agreement” (Habermas 1987:315). In contrast to instrumental rationality, where knowledge is constructed primarily through techno-scientific analysis, communicative rationality recognises that meaning, value, understanding and knowledge are all socially constructed. As a result, communicative rationality calls for “collaborative and reflexive processes of building consensus around shared meanings and understandings which are grounded in dialogue” (McGuirk 2001:196).

Drawing on insights from this approach, communicative planning theory emerged in an effort to transform the power context of planning (e.g. Forester 1999; Healey 1997; Innes 1995) – a theoretical development that is paralled in ecological economics by the interest in the use of deliberative methods and participatory approaches in environmental valuation and decision-making (O’Hara 1996; O’Connor 2000; Spash et al. 2005; Rauschmayer et al. 2009). Communicative planning attempts to create power-neutral forums by minimising systematic distortions of communication. These distortions, created by such things as restricting argumentation, excluding participants, obscuring issues, or limiting knowledge, are seen as leading to domination by powerful groups (Forester 1989). A power-neutral forum, on the other hand, is sought by approximating Habermas’ (1984) ideal speech situation. The essential requirements for this are that all parties affected by a discussion be included, and that all parties be equally informed and equally empowered to represent themselves in discussion. The objective is to empower a variety of forms of knowledge, rationality, and value that are normally excluded in planning practices, such that all participants are able to deliberate on equal footing and eventually establish new consensual ways of thinking, valuing and acting (Healey 1997:29). Many of these positive aspects of communicative planning theory are evident in the collaborative planning approach taken on Haida Gwaii.  

The problem with such an approach is that it overlooks the larger historically and socially constructed structures which pervade communicative processes. In contrast to Habermas’ consensual approach, Foucault emphasised resistance, struggle and conflict as the main means for achieving greater democracy and freedom from domination. While Habermas considered consensus seeking and freedom from domination inherent parts of communication, Foucault and others emphasise the way in which communication is at all times penetrated by power. The focus shifts from an attempt to neutralise power by fulfilling key procedural requirements to understanding the realities of power through a focus on actual political practices (Flyvbjerg 2001:102). Analysis is grounded in an understanding of history and sociality as the foundation for understanding the conditions that create power relations. Efforts are directed towards an analysis of strategies and tactics and an attempt to understand how oppressive relations might be changed. In Foucault’s words, the “political task” is “to criticize the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent to criticize them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them” (Foucault 1974:71). 

The understanding of communication as penetrated by power is paralleled in ecological economics by the focus on different languages of valuation.  In addition, structural and other aspects of power are highlighted in studies on environmental conflicts (Martinez-Alier 2002, Guha and Martinez-Alier 1997). In general, however, the theoretical treatment of power is not strong in ecological economics and related issues are usually discussed in terms of institutions.​[3]​ 

To achieve a fuller understanding of power, the microanalysis of strategies and tactics may be combined with a macroanalysis of institutions and structures. For this purpose, a conceptual framework adopting a general format of three levels of power will be used. Drawing inspiration from multi-layered models of power proposed by Clegg (1989) Haugaard (1997) Lemke (2003) and others, the concept of power is understood as consisting of three distinct but highly interdependent layers: 1) agency power, 2) institutional power and 3) structural power. 

Agency power is the most visible form of power and, consequently, what the term “power” typically refers to. Agency power is about the capacity of agents to “name” and “frame” societal problems as political problems, and to mobilise resources to formulate and realise the most desirable solutions (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004:350). Habermas’ communicative approach strives to empower marginalized voices to achieve this through the creation of power neutral forums where the only form of power that remains is the force of the better and more rational argument. From a conflict perspective, however, power is derived from the capacities agents acquire as a result of resource control. These include material resources such as money and physical capital; moral support in the form of solidarity; social organisation including organisational strategies, social networks, and alliances; human resources such as volunteers, staff and leaders; and cultural resources including prior experience, understanding of issues, and ability to initiate collective action.​[4]​ Success is then dependent on the effectiveness of an agent to activate these resources and target them toward their goals. However, when power stays exclusively at this level, it automatically reproduces any existing conditions of domination since it does not challenge existing rules or structures (Clegg 1989:217-220). Questions of transformation arise only when challenges are made at the level of institutions and structures.

Institutional power addresses the more or less “systematized, regulated and reflected modes of power that go beyond the spontaneous exercise of power over others” (Lemke 2003:5). It consists of institutions as sets of rules that define such things as which norms are legitimate, how issues may be raised and how interests are to be articulated. It relates to such things as the setting of agendas, formulation of policies, the way decisions will be made, and how measures will be implemented. It also defines who should or should not be involved with which decisions, how one can get involved, and what the relationship is between those inside and outside of a particular process (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004:342). Agents are positioned in relation to one another on the basis of the rules and division of decision-making power, and this affects what agents may achieve. The intention behind Habermas’ communicative rationality, then, is to develop a set of procedures and norms at an institutional level that the parties agree do not arbitrarily privilege some goals over others. Alternatively, coalitions may challenge the rules of the game in an effort to change unfavourable institutional arrangements. 

Structural power refers to the macro-societal structures that shape the nature and conduct of agents. It relates to meaning produced through language and discursive practices, moral order produced through the naturalization of societal norms, values and standards, and the resulting structured asymmetries of resources. Through these structures, agents give meaning to the social world, evaluate the legitimacy of acts and thoughts, and are enabled or constrained to mobilise resources to achieve their goals. These forms of structural power are “materialised” in the institutions of the state, market and civil society giving rise to structural bias and the consequent relations of power and powerlessness. These forms of structural power often appear stable and difficult to reverse. At the same time, many dominant social structures within a given social order had to be fought for and still require vigilance to maintain them (Haugaard 2003:96).

It follows that those who are disadvantaged by certain structures must try to expand the conditions of possibility by building consensus around new meanings, norms and values (Ibid.:95). New meanings may be produced by those in a dominant position who hold the power to restructure social forms according to their own interests and values.​[5]​ However, to impose a new meaning that contradicts the institutionalised meaning and is also perceived as a threat to dominant interests almost certainly entails a major collective conscious action (Castells 1983:304-305). Over time, if a significant enough number of people confirm the new meaning, a capacity for action will be created relative to issues which previously lay outside the conditions of possibility. If successful, systemic change will eventually be forced upon those who try to maintain the status quo. 

Overall, the extent to which agents are able to achieve their desired outcome will depend, in part, on their capabilities at the level of goals and, in part, on the constraining or enabling effects of broader institutional, political, and social conditions. With this understanding in mind, we now turn to the case.  

3. Brief historical background of the present conflict

To begin unravelling the complexities of power, it is useful to briefly historicise the structural and institutional setting of the present conflict and to uncover the dynamics of alliance building and contestation leading up to the collaborative planning process.  

Haida oral history supported by recent archaeological records traces the Haida people’s connection to the land and waters of Haida Gwaii back more than 10,000 year. However, ever since explorers embarked on the maritime fur trade in the 1780s, Haida Gwaii has been viewed by outsiders largely in terms of the resources that could be profitably extracted (Martineau 2002). A rapid depopulation of the Haida people in the nineteenth century, as a result of epidemics brought over by Europeans, facilitated the imposition of colonial forms of governance and subsequent European settlement and control of resources. The ensuing replacement of Haida economies with colonial economies was most clearly demonstrated by the forest industry.​[6]​   

In British Columbia, the home province of Haida Gwaii, ninety-four percent of forested lands are considered to be publicly owned. However, the provincial government established treaties with First Nations​[7]​ for only three percent of the land. This contravened Great Britain’s Royal Proclamation of 1764 which called for a formal agreement or treaty to be signed before an indigenous population could be disturbed from their title to the land. Since the 1940s, these “crown” lands have been managed through a forest tenure system which established a set of property rights giving logging companies the ability to rent long-term harvesting rights for relatively little cost in exchange for maintaining basic processing operations. Despite First Nations sustained defence of their title to traditional territories, the provincial government of British Columbia consistently ignored their concerns in favour of extraction and profit (Harris 2002).​[8]​

By the 1960s a substantial body of human rights legislation entered onto the national and international scene. Supported by a growing global indigenous rights movement, the fight for Aboriginal rights and title in British Columbia resurged in the 1970s. At the national level, the landmark 1973 Calder case confirmed the existence of Aboriginal title at a conceptual level leading the federal government to recognize Aboriginal land claims. Nevertheless, the government of British Columbia maintained the position that Aboriginal title had been extinguished by accumulated events over the past century (Boyd and Williams-Davidson 2000:134).

The resurgence of the fight for Aboriginal rights coincided with a growing critique of forest management. In the 1940s the approach of sustained-yield forestry had been introduced in response to concerns over the unbridled exploitation of timber. The principle of sustained yield required that the average annual harvest of the forest not exceed its average annual growth. But in the midst of rapid post-war economic growth, successive provincial governments turned to the forestry sector to finance the modern infrastructure of the provincial economy (Jackson and Curry 2004). With greatly expanding logging from the 1960s onwards, British Columbia’s forest policy came under increasing fire. As awareness of increasing resource scarcity, declining environmental quality and the rights of indigenous peoples grew, conflict began to spread throughout the province. And as it did, the potential for alliances between First Nations and environmentalists became increasingly evident. 

On Haida Gwaii, this situation was reflected in a battle that took off in 1974 over logging in an area known to be an important cultural and archaeological site by the Haida and a source of immense ecological diversity. The desire by both Haida and environmentalists to stop logging in this area, known to the Haida as Gwaii Haanas, sparked the formation of the first formal organisation of Haida and non-Haida Islanders. Concurrently, the Haida established the Council of the Haida Nation, a unified political body of the Haida people, and began to advance their comprehensive land claim with the federal government. By the early 1980s, the fight by environmentalists for a protected “wilderness area” became explicitly linked with the Haida’s land claim. It would take nearly two decades of lobbying, protest, public education, advisory committees, court cases, and a major direct action before the conflict would be settled.​[9]​ Finally, in 1993 an agreement was reached by the Haida Nation and federal government of Canada to jointly manage Gwaii Haanas National Park Reserve and Haida Heritage Site.​[10]​ The 147,000 acre park reserve was the first park of its kind in Canada to be co-managed by a First Nation and the federal government.

Elsewhere in the province, however, unsustainable rates of logging continued. Inflated annual allowable harvest rates created short-term prosperity but resulted in long-term overcut. Throughout the 1980s, volumes of timber cut and manufactured continued to increase while employment steadily decreased.​[11]​ People were replaced by machines as companies fought to compete in an ever more competitive and volatile market for low value-added products (Marchak 1986, Hayter 2000).  

On Haida Gwaii, increasing incidents of forest mismanagement alongside decreasing community benefits began to spark concern not only among Haida and environmentalists but also local loggers and politicians. In 1995 a provincial report revealed that the amount of wood being cut in the timber supply area of Haida Gwaii was 2.2 times higher than the long-term sustainable harvest rate. In response, the Islands Community Stability Initiative (ICSI) was established by elected representatives from each of the communities on Haida Gwaii in order to convey their concerns to the Province with a unified voice. ICSI demanded that logging be reduced to its long-term sustainable level while calling for more local manufacturing and processing and greater influence in forest management. While ICSI managed to obtain some minor concessions, their central demand for a reduction in the annual allowable harvest continued to be ignored.

Meanwhile, the central issue for the Haida remained the resolution of their land and ownership rights. In 1995, the Haida Nation took legal action challenging the renewal of the largest tree farm licence on the islands, TFL 39. The Haida argued that the Minister of Forests had no authority to renew the licence because the land was encumbered by Aboriginal title. In 1997, the British Columbia Court of Appeal affirmed that the land was indeed encumbered by Aboriginal title – however, only once title was proven (Williams-Davidson 2005:3). Nevertheless, the court strongly urged the Crown to consult with the Haida Nation. That same year, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed in the landmark Delgamuukw decision that Aboriginal title had not been extinguished by colonisation or settlement. 

Elsewhere in the province, the war in the woods intensified as environmentalists turned their attention to thirty-five million acres of temperate rainforests along the north and central coast of British Columbia.​[12]​ Employing a new international market strategy, environmentalists combined direct-action campaigns in England, Germany and later the US with an intense global market campaign. As the threat to boycott companies purchasing wood from British Columbia’s central and northern coast took hold, many large investors cancelled their orders. Affected logging companies were forced to defer logging in 140 valleys in order negotiate a resolution with environmentalists. Concurrently, eight First Nation communities on British Columbia’s central and north coast including Haida Gwaii came together to form the Turning Point Initiative. The coast-wide united front called for respect for Aboriginal rights and title, increased local control, and implementation of sustainable ecosystem-based management. Recognising the need for cooperation to find a resolution to outstanding conflict, industry, labour, local government and environmental groups came together to develop a common set of principles.

On April 4, 2001, the Province endorsed recommendations put forward by industry, environmentalists, labour and First Nations. The landmark agreement included protection for forty-two old-growth coastal rainforest valleys, deferred logging in another seventy-seven valleys, and a commitment to ecosystem-based planning (Shaw 2003:52). In addition, the Province signed an agreement with First Nations’ involved in the Turning Point Initiative facilitating their involvement in forestry and giving them a new role in decision-making and resource management. It was in connection with this latter agreement that the Haida Nation and the Province of British Columbia signed the Haida Protocol on Interim Measures and Land Use Planning, committing the two governments to establish a collaborative, ecosystem-based land use planning process.

From this brief historical overview, several structural shifts are evident. Most notable is the shift from colonial assumptions of property and title to acknowledgement of continuing Aboriginal title; and an expansion from utilitarian perceptions of nature to acknowledgement of nature’s intrinsic worth. Related is a gradual recognition of the link between First Nations’ culture and territory, an increasingly holistic rather than reductionist understanding of ecosystems, and a growing awareness of the role of human ethics and preferences in resource decision making. These structural shifts are both engendered by action and change at agency and institutional levels, while simultaneously providing social space for novel action at various levels. The events of the next sections build and expand on these evolving social spaces.

4. Ecosystem-based management

The shift from conventional resource management to an ecosystem-based approach entails a shift in perception from a view of humans as dominating nature to an understanding of humans as stewards of nature. The approach of ecosystem-based management has helped the environmental movement in British Columbia expand its arguments, clarify its goals and build support for preserving old-growth forests (Wilson 1998:14-15). At the same time, First Nations have called for ecosystem-based management as a means to preserve the integrity of their homelands while they battle, in the courts and at treaty negotiating tables, to re-establish their title to the land.
 
In contrast to conventional resource management which focuses on the monetary values found in ecosystems, ecosystem-based management recognizes ecosystems as whole systems and emphasizes the importance of maintaining their integrity. While precise definitions of ecosystem-based management vary, Grumbine’s (1994:5) definition is often cited: “Ecosystem management integrates scientific knowledge of ecological relationships within a complex sociopolitical and values framework toward the general goal of protecting native ecosystem integrity over the long term.” In most instances, the aim to maintain or restore ecosystem integrity requires the management of human activity impacting it. This implies situating economic and political activities within the limits of a functioning ecosystem in order to minimise environmental “externalities” in the production process (International Network of Forests and Communities 2002). The purpose of the approach, however, is not to maintain static ecosystems but rather to ensure that ecosystems are able to self-regulate and perpetuate themselves, in order to avoid ecological, social or political catastrophes which may result from their collapse (Holling and Meffe 1996).

However, the question as to whether certain changes to an affected ecosystem resulting from human activity are ecologically acceptable or not is essentially a human value judgment dependent on which issues are identified as most important (Kay 1993). Thus, in addition to an understanding of ecological processes, an understanding of the social, economic, political, and cultural context can be just as important to the success of ecosystem-based management (Mabee et al. 2003:5). The attempt to integrate these various perspectives into ecosystem-based management practices quickly reveals the different and often contradictory values and interests in competition.

When this element of human value is combined with the ecosystem qualities of uncertainty, unpredictability, and lack of control, the concept of ecological integrity enters the realm of post-normal science. In contrast to normal science, post-normal science recognises that expert-oriented decision making and “objective” answers are no longer ethically appropriate to matters concerning complex systems, high uncertainty, and large stakes in terms of ecological and socio-economic impacts (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993, 2007). While acknowledging the importance of science to inform decision-making, post-normal science recognises that all decisions are ultimately “an expression of human ethics and preferences and of the socio-political context in which they were made” (Kay et al. quoted in McCarthy 1999). Because of this understanding, post-normal science emphasises the importance of extended participation in decision making:

[T]he dynamic resolution of policy issues in post-normal science involves the inclusion of an ever-growing set of legitimate participants in the process of quality assurance of the scientific inputs…. In this way, its practice (science) is becoming more akin to the workings of a democratic society, characterized by extensive participation and toleration of diversity (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993:751).

This kind of understanding overlaps with communicative planning’s call for the inclusion and empowerment of a variety of forms of knowledge, rationality and value that are traditionally excluded in planning processes – a need that is strongly emphasized in studies on socio-ecological systems (Berkes and Folke 1998). However, the question remains as to what extent inclusive processes are able to overcome structural forms of inequality. The next section begins by examining the limits of collaborative planning through a consensus approach before turning to a broader conflict understanding of the situation.  

5. Collaborative land use planning on Haida Gwaii

In 2001, the first stage of the collaborative land use planning process was set in motion. Although the intention behind the provincially-initiated process may have been inspired less by a desire to empower marginalised voices than by the need to resolve rising conflict and falling profits in the forest industry, it nevertheless aspired to many of the conditions for creating a power-neutral forum outlined in communicative planning theory.

While participation in collaborative planning processes as a means for marginalized groups to make progress towards their goals has been roundly critiqued (e.g. Wilson 1998; Brosius 1999; Whelans and Lyons 2005) the collaborative process on Haida Gwaii appeared to present a number of unique conditions. An important first step toward balancing power relations was the adoption of the Haida’s demand that the process be co-managed and co-chaired by the Council of the Haida Nation. Co-management not only provided the Haida with greater control over the direction and design of the planning process, it also implicitly acknowledged the Council of the Haida Nation as a sovereign authority. To assist the Haida with participation in planning and negotiation, financial support was also provided. A consensus-seeking, inclusive community planning forum was jointly established by the two governments and charged with making recommendations for land use. Unlike similar forums where typically only industry and government participants are paid for their participation, in response to community representatives’ demand, all participants were offered remuneration for their participation. In addition to a jointly-appointed process management team and process technical team, the forum consisted of twenty-nine people representing fifteen interests and sectors. These can be broken down, with some overlap, into the following groups (the number of people representing each interest or sector is indicated in parentheses):

	Haida: Council of the Haida Nation (2), Band Councils (2), Haida cultural values (2), cultural heritage tourism (2), non-timber forest products (1), and subsurface resources (1)
	Industry: major forest tenure holders (2), small business forestry (2), and subsurface resources (1)
	Provincial government (2)
	Ecosystems: terrestrial ecosystems (2) and aquatic ecosystems (2)
	Community stability: forest-based employment (1), local government (2), non-timber forest products (1), tourism (2), and public interest (2)

Any outstanding matter remaining at the end of the planning forum process were to be dealt with through a government-to-government negotiation process between the Province and the Council of the Haida Nation. Furthermore, in an effort to balance Haida interests and environmental concerns against the traditionally dominant forestry interests, recommendations were to be guided by two documents: the Ecosystem-based Management Framework and the Haida Land Use Vision.

5.1 Ecosystem-based Management Framework

An independent multi-disciplinary body, known as the Coast Information Team, was charged with providing a common set of scientific resources for the development and implementation of ecosystem-based management.​[13]​ In the framework developed by them, ecosystem-based management is defined as:

…an adaptive approach to managing human activities that seeks to ensure the coexistence of healthy, fully functioning ecosystems and human communities. 

The intent is to maintain those spatial and temporal characteristics of ecosystems such that component species and ecological processes can be sustained, and human wellbeing supported and improved” (Coast Information Team 2004:2).

Conservation planning and risk management are two central elements. Conservation planning entails the development of a system of protected areas and reserves in order to sustain important ecological and/or human values. In order to maintain ecological structures in unprotected areas, particular trees, groups of trees, plant communities or other important features can be designated for preservation or management at the site level. Risk management starts from the assumption that “risk increases in proportion to the amount that management causes patterns and processes to depart from their natural range” (Ibid.:7). For any indicator (e.g. old-growth forests or bird specie) risk is divided into low, moderate and high. Low risk begins at the point where adverse impacts first begin to be detected. High risk begins at the point where “significant loss of ecological function is expected to occur” (Ibid.:8). The range of moderate risk is more difficult to pinpoint, due to the uncertain nature and non-linear response of ecosystems. Nevertheless, a precautionary management approach that seeks to maintain high ecological integrity requires that the overall risk at a subregional scale remain at or below the low risk threshold. It is unnecessary, however, to maintain high ecological integrity at all spatial planning scales, as long as low risk management is being achieved at the overall subregional and landscape scales. This means that there is flexibility at the lower spatial scales to allow for more economic/extractive activity in areas that are of little ecological or cultural significance while maintaining a high level of ecological integrity in areas with significant conservation values.

In addition to ecological concerns, the implications of land use decisions for the social and economic well-being of communities must be considered. The goal here is to “create and implement plans that will generate wealth, provide sustainable livelihoods, distribute benefits and burdens equitably, and enhance cultural, community, and household wellbeing” (Ibid.:7). This entails developing agreed upon cultural and socio-economic objectives by which plans can be assessed – no small challenge for a group of people with many conflicting views and interests. At the same time, it seeks new and innovative ways of thinking about planning, economics and institutions. Towards these objectives, the Haida Land Use Vision provided an important contribution.

5.2 Haida Land Use Vision

The second guiding document, the Haida Land Use Vision, presents a contemporary indigenous vision of nature-society relations as an alternative to the decontextualised, exchange-value dominated discourses of land and forests. Taking its opening lines from the Constitution of the Haida Nation​[14]​ it begins by asserting its sovereignty over the land:

The Haida Nation is the rightful heir to Haida Gwaii.
Our culture, our heritage, is the child of respect and intimacy with the land and sea.
Like the forests, the roots of our people are intertwined such that the greatest troubles cannot overcome us.
We owe our existence to Haida Gwaii.
The living generation accepts the responsibility to ensure that our heritage is passed on to following generations.
On these islands our ancestors lived and died, and here too we will make our homes until called away to join them in the great beyond.

Central to the vision is the concept of Yah’guudang:

Yah’guudang – our respect for all living things – celebrates the ways our lives and spirits are intertwined and honours the responsibility we hold to future generations.

Haida Gwaii Yah’guudang is about respect and responsibility, about knowing our place in the web of life, and how the fate of our culture runs parallel with the fate of the ocean, sky and forest people (Council of the Haida Nation 2004:3).

The document relates, from a collective Haida understanding, their knowledge of the natural world and how things have changed over time. It focuses on six central elements, cedar, salmon, black bears, birds, plants and beaches, describing how each of these plays a significant role in the natural world and in the lives of the Haida people. Of particular concern is the damage that has been caused by industrial activity in recent times.

To bring land and resource use into balance, a set of seven maps are presented. One outlines the fourteen Haida Protected Areas which encompass areas of particular cultural significance where no industrial activity is to take place.​[15]​ Together, they cover an area of approximately 250,000 hectares or about one quarter of the land. The other six maps recommend additional protected areas for maintaining the cedar, salmon, bears, plants, birds and beaches. At the same time, the Haida Land Use Vision is not anti-logging. Rather, it demands that logging and other commercial activities on Haida Gwaii be managed with more respect and greater responsibility, that is, “in accordance with Yah’guudang” (Ibid. 18).

5.3 The Planning Process

The preceding overview of the institutional framework for the collaborative planning process seems to suggest that significant measures had been taken to allow for the expression of alternative knowledge, values and rationalities. However, as the process progressed it became clear that certain decisions of central importance to the land would not be up for negotiation. Existing policy and legislation including existing tenure arrangements, contracts, regulations, and governance were to be left firmly in the hands of the Province to be managed at a technical professional level, while the particular details of land use within these constraints would be open for discussion. This reflected the unassailability of existing arrangements of contract and property and the continuing dominance of technocratic control over decision making.​[16]​ Similarly, although the agenda at the planning forum was open to input from the table, there were certain unspoken expectations around what discussions should include or exclude. According to the predominant discourse of knowledge in the fields of forestry and resource management, the question of “how the land should be managed” was a technical exercise in zoning to determine which areas should be protected from industrial resource extraction, placed under special management, or remain open to industry. A central concern for community representatives, however, was the very structure of high-volume logging, corporate control, and minimal community benefits. Their vision of a sustainable model of low-volume logging with maximum community benefits required new and innovative thinking on issues such as governance, local control, log exports, local manufacturing, and economic diversification. These issues, however, were considered outside the formal mandate of the planning process. Thus, despite the “soft” institutional infrastructure of social collaboration and democratic deliberations, the hard infrastructure of property, legal frameworks, and policies derived from dominant structural understandings took precedence.  

Still, the bulk of information and analyses presented at the forum dealt with key ecosystems and species on the Islands including old forest ecosystems, watershed conditions, plant species and communities, endangered birds, the unique Haida Gwaii black bear, salmon and the culturally-central cedar trees. Extensive ecological inventories were accompanied by comprehensive recommendations for minimising risks to ecological integrity (Holt 2005). Much of this information, which was researched and presented by a range of experts in each field, confirmed what many community members already suspected: that too much of the best timber had been taken too quickly, leaving old-growth ecosystems and the creatures dependent on them at risk. Studies revealed that two-thirds of the forests on Haida Gwaii had already been harvested with only 10-15 percent of the highest quality old-growth forests remaining, much of which was highly inaccessible. 

However, forestry company representatives at the forum disputed the information presented. One forester called the old-growth projections “a lie” adding that, as far as harvesting was concerned, the amount of old-growth forest remaining was not even the main issue since there was also a vast amount of second growth that would soon be harvestable. Moreover, industry representatives disagreed with the risk thresholds for ecosystem-based management put forward by the Coast Information Team. According to research put forward by the independent research team, a 30 percent reduction of old-growth forests was identified as the low-risk threshold for maintaining ecosystem integrity, while a 70 percent reduction of old-growth forests was considered to be the high-risk threshold. The forest ecologist for Weyerhaeuser, the largest forest licensee on the islands, challenged these findings contending that a 30 percent reduction of forests presented no risk to species and ecosystems and that a goal of between 40-70 percent reduction of old forests was reasonable and within the low- to moderate-risk range for ecosystems. A 70 percent reduction of old forests was certainly more consistent with the values and preferences of industry. However, it completely contradicted the Coast Information Team’s judgements of ecologically acceptable risk.

Ecosystem-based management clearly did not meet the interests of industry, and as the process drew nearer to the end, industry representatives increasingly defended their position in favour of the status quo while community representatives rallied their support behind the Haida Land Use Vision and a “vote for change.” This was not so much an indication of a monolithic local community devoid of differences as it was a reflection of the community representatives collective will to create a united front in the face of a common adversary. The conflict with major forest licensees at the table provided much of the impetus for this. At the same time, a longer history of distrust and distaste for the provincial government was stirred up through the process further driving the alliance.

The outcome was conveyed in the draft Recommendation Report for Land Use. While consensus was reached on a number of less contentious issues, when it came to recommendations with the potential to impact logging two diverging sets of options emerged: one for the community and one for industry. The community called for a diversified, locally-controlled economy based on sustainable forestry practices, local manufacturing, tourism and other sustainable industries. Their recommendations, agreed to by almost all Haida and non-Haida community representatives, were fully consistent with the Haida Land Use Vision and followed the recommendations for ecosystem-based management laid out by the Coast Information Team. Industry’s recommendations, on the other hand, by and large stuck by the status quo under the assumption that existing laws and regulations were already adequate to maintain the environment. Their recommendations, supported by up to four industry representatives, followed neither the Haida Land Use Vision nor the recommendations for ecosystem-based management. Nevertheless, their recommendations were presented in the report on par with the community’s recommendations. Moreover, industry’s recommendations were inserted directly into the recommendation report without any previous presentation to or discussion by the table. This controversial decision reflected the Province’s long-standing allegiance with resource extracting industries and continuing prioritisation of capital over other values. The overall effect was that the community’s priorities appeared patronised and the guiding documents trivialised.

The institutional bias was made more blatant by a less known legal condition that if a licensee voluntarily agreed to reduce their annual allowable cut through a land use planning process, the company risked losing their ability to receive compensation from the Province for the reduction. On the other hand, if a licensee opposed recommendations that would reduce their harvest levels, but a final land use plan was put in place that required the Province to reduce their annual allowable cut, then the licensee would be compensated for any losses. This, in effect, compelled industry to maintain the status quo.

Council of the Haida Nation president, Guujaaw, made his view of the industry-developed recommendations exceedingly clear: it was unacceptable to include a set of recommendations that compromised the Haida Land Use Vision. Husby Forest Products President, Bob Brash, stated that their professionals had some major concerns with the community’s recommendations, and that he did not want to discuss certain technical issues with “non-experts.” Hereditary Chief, Alan Wilson responded in no uncertain terms: “I’ve also consulted with my experts – my parents, grandparents, uncles and aunts – and they know exactly what they’re talking about.” While industry representatives insisted that community members did not understand the immense socio-economic impacts of their recommendations, it seemed that community representatives had chosen to rally against what they knew to be the destructive impacts of the status quo.​[17]​

After the nearly two-year community forum process, positions were now more refined but just as polarised and perhaps even more entrenched than before. While the process had helped to strengthen community relationships and bring about a strong community consensus, resolution of contentious issues with industry were to be left to negotiations between the Haida Nation and the Province, and the ultimate question of what the Province was willing to accommodate or not. By turning to parallel events occurring outside the forum, a broader socio-political context for the provincial state’s actions becomes apparent alongside the dynamics of grassroots collaboration and mobilization at work.

6. External politics and manoeuvring

At the same time as the provincial government was co-managing the collaborative planning process, elsewhere the Province was taking measures to radically deregulate forestry. In a move labelled as “unprecedented in modern democracies”​[18]​ a barrage of amendments and repeals to the Forest Act and Forest Practices Code were made between 2002 and 2004. The changes gave forestry companies an unprecedented degree of authority, while legislating the Province’s own authority out. For example, measures to protect the environment could only be applied if they did “not unduly reduce the supply of timber” and could not affect a forestry company’s ability to remain “vigorous, efficient and world competitive” (Forest and Range Practices Act 2004). In addition, the Province’s consent was no longer required when Crown tenures, that is, rights to log on public and indigenous land, were sold or transferred. Since approval of licence transfers by the Province could be used to ensure that the new licence holders accommodated First Nation rights and interests, a potentially important tool available to First Nations was lost.

Meanwhile, in 2002 the Haida launched their title case asserting Aboriginal rights and title to the land, inland waters, seabed and sea of Haida Gwaii. Their Statement of Claim called for compensation for damages to the land caused by “unlawful occupation” and “infringement of Aboriginal Title and Rights,” an accounting from the Province of “all profits, taxes, stumpage dues, royalties and other benefits,” and a quashing of all “forestry, fisheries, mineral and other tenures permits and licences” issued without accommodation with the Haida Nation.​[19]​ 

In 2004, the final appeal of a second TFL 39 case running since 2000 was heard. The Supreme Court of Canada was to decide whether the Province and/or the licensee, Weyerhaeuser, were obligated to consult and accommodate Haida interests in the sale and transfer of TFL 39, the largest tree farm licence on the Islands. Two days before the hearing, in a move unprecedented in the history of Canada the mayors of the two largest non-Haida communities on Haida Gwaii, Masset and Port Clements, signed a Community Protocol Agreement with the Council of the Haida Nation. Through the agreement, Haida title was recognised by the two non-Haida communities while the Council of the Haida Nation guaranteed individual property rights for non-Haida residents and committed to shared Island governance. This was an important gesture toward reconciling injustices of a colonial past while providing assurances of a shared future for all islanders. With the agreement under his belt, Mayor Dale Lore proceeded to the Supreme Court of Canada on behalf of his community of Port Clements with an intervenor statement that embodied a growing consensus among Islanders: they had more faith in the Haida’s ability to sustainably manage the forests than in the Province’s.

Eight months later, the court handed down its decision in the case stating that the provincial government was indeed obligated to consult with First Nations and accommodate their interests before granting, reapproving or transferring a tree farm licence. In the words of the Judge, “the Crown acting honorably, cannot cavalierly run roughshod over aboriginal interests where claims affecting these interests are being seriously pursued.”​[20]​ The ruling was described as “a tremendous victory felt throughout the indigenous world” and “a wake up call for the government of British Columbia and Canada.”​[21]​  

Nevertheless, three months later and only one week before the collaborative planning process was to conclude its last meetings, Brascan Corporation announced they had reached a deal with Weyerhaeuser to acquire its coastal assets including TFL 39 on Haida Gwaii. Once again there was no consultation with the Haida Nation and no accommodation of their interests despite three court rulings in their favour. In fact, the Province had conveniently legislated itself out of the duty to approve license transfers while the TFL 39 case was making its way through the court system, and now claimed that it had no authority over the licence transfer. The Province’s action, however, had not gone unnoticed by the Supreme Court Judge who stated in her ruling that provincial legislation was to be used by the Province to fulfil their obligation to First Nations rather than to avoid their obligation.​[22]​

The final blow came when, only days after the Community Planning Forum had concluded its last meeting, the Province proceeded to authorise logging in areas designated as cultural cedar reserves in the Haida Land Use Vision. Council of the Haida Nation president, Guujaaw, charged the Province with making a mockery of the land use planning process. The lack of meaningful consultation, deregulation of provincial forestry policy, and now the latest assault on an area designated for protection by the community added up to an explosive combination.
 
7. Islands Spirit Rising

On March 22, 2005, the barricades went up. Two public roads were blocked preventing Weyerhaeuser from accessing its logging operations and the British Columbia Forest Service from entering its offices. A website for the action had been created by this time, and the first bulletin read:

We have made alliances and partnerships and entered processes in good faith in attempts to balance the interests of the land and culture with an economy. We have also shown that the “Island Community” is compatible with Haida Aboriginal Title during this time and have presented jointly-supported solutions for resolve.

In the past two years, the Province has taken the approach of getting out of the way of industry, and practically handed all management responsibility and accountability to the companies. Never in the history of the Province has a government been so weak in its ability to manage and regulate natural resource industries.

After an 18-month “Land Use Planning” process and strong consensus amongst the Island people, the BC Ministry of Forests continues to compromise the outcome through approval of logging inside of areas cited for protection.

Weyerhaeuser has shown no respect for the land, the culture, or the people who have worked for them. Weyerhaeuser has also shown no respect for its own word. In commitments made to the CHN [Council of the Haida Nation], the communities and the people who work for them, five of the six commitments have been violated. Now the company is poised to sell its interests and in its final hours is attempting to strip all that it can from this land.

The opportunity to design a future that maintains the land and culture while providing for a sustainable economy is in our hands. The next generation will not have the same chance if the forest industry is allowed to strip our lands in the next few years.​[23]​

A blockade twenty years ago had brought a halt to logging in the most southern part of Haida Gwaii and led to the creation of Gwaii Haanas National Park Reserve and Haida Heritage Site. More typically, however, blockades around the province ended with court-ordered injunctions granted affably to resource-extracting companies and a quick return to business-as-usual with protesters escorted off by police.

However, the present situation presented an interesting set of circumstances. The provincial government was in a legally precarious situation having neglected to consult with the Haida Nation over the latest transfer and renewal of TFL 39 despite the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision obligating them to do so. More importantly, the provincial government was entering an election campaign and wanted desperately to avoid bad publicity involving conflict with disgruntled First Nations and environmentalists.​[24]​ Weyerhaeuser was in a similarly vulnerable position. Not only was the company on the verge of closing its 1.2 billion dollar deal with Brascan, it was facing allegations that it had breached an agreement made with the Haida Nation and local forest workers in 2002.

On the second day of the blockade, the Haida Nation placed seizure notices on logs recently cut by Weyerhaeuser estimated to be worth $5-10 million Canadian.​[25]​ The Haida announced that the logs were seized in response to Weyerhaeuser’s alleged breach of contract. The news hit the national media. As news of the blockade spread, so did support for it. After two weeks, the Islands Spirit Rising website, which posted regular bulletins and commentaries, had had over 80,000 hits. By the third week, a province-wide coalition of forty-nine non-governmental organisations, labour unions, and Indigenous Peoples organisations, known as the British Columbia Coalition for Sustainable Forest Solutions, threw their support behind the Haida and communities of Haida Gwaii. In an open letter to the Premier, they urged the Province to deal honourably with the Haida and other First Nations, and to fundamentally rethink recent changes to forestry and environmental laws.

Behind the front lines, a different side of the blockade was developing. One of the checkpoints was established alongside the Yakoun River in an area known to be one of the Haida’s ancient seasonal camps. In the camp, Haida artisans took on a variety of projects including weaving of cedar hats from traditionally prepared bark strips, and carving of cedar masks and argillite sculptures. Several teams of carvers also worked on a large multi-person drum, two eighteen-foot cedar canoes and an impressive thirty-six foot cedar canoe.​[26]​ All three canoes were constructed from trees that had blown down – a common phenomena that occurs when forests are logged and the remaining adjacent hard forest edges are exposed to strong wind. In the evenings, people gathered around a bon fire for drumming, singing and story telling. Nationally-acclaimed Haida carver, Christian White, remarked that the blockade had become a part of the Haida people’s cultural reawakening.​[27]​

However, not everyone was supportive of the blockade. While most resident loggers agreed the situation in the forests had to be fixed, many were angry about a solution that put them out of work. As for Weyerhaeuser and the Province, both refuted allegations made against them. The Province’s Minister of Forestry Operations, Roger Harris, contended that the Province had made efforts to consult and accommodate the Haida, referencing in particular a treaty offer made in 2003. Guujaaw scoffed at the suggestion, maintaining that the treaty offer had been a very bad deal for the Haida. Weyerhaeuser’s vice-president of Canadian forest lands, Tom Holmes, insisted that the company had “extended itself to accommodate the Haida in numerous ways” and contended that the company was simply caught in the middle of “an epic legal battle between two sovereign powers – the Haida and the BC government – over who controls the forest.”​[28]​

Already by the first week of the blockade, organisers had developed a proposal they said would “help the Province save face” and bring an end to the conflict. The general direction was clear, as Council of the Haida Nation spokesperson, Gilbert Parnell, told a province-wide radio broadcast:

The people here would like to see the work that we’ve done in the land use planning process, a joint process between the province and the Council of the Haida Nation, …implemented. And what is found in that process is a common vision by Islanders from a variety of interests for sustainability into the future.”​[29]​

As the blockade entered its third week, serious negotiations got underway. A delegation made up of Council of the Haida Nation executives and Haida Hereditary Chiefs met with representatives from the Premier’s Office.​[30]​ While the Ministry of Agriculture and Lands would normally be in charge of such matters, the Premier’s Office had a different agenda at the moment which was to clear up the conflict and ensure there were no glitches in the Premier’s reelection campaign. At the end of four days of intense negotiations, a memorandum of understanding described as “a very good deal” for the Haida was struck between the Province and the Haida Nation.​[31]​ Highlights included interim protection for all fourteen Haida Protected Areas, cultural and archaeological cedar stands and bird nesting habitat as identified in the Haida Land Use Vision. In addition, the Haida were offered a volume-based forest tenure of 120,000 cubic metres per year, and $5 million as preliminary compensation for resources extracted from the Islands. On the Haida’s demand, there was also agreement to reconvene a community forum in order to address the critical issues of economic transition and community stability glossed over in the planning process. This would later take the form of the Community Viability Strategy. With the agreement in place, the Province and the Council of the Haida Nation continued to negotiate details towards a land use plan.

Strong opposition to the direction of negotiations was immediately expressed by the major forest licensees. In a full-page ad placed in the local paper, they asserted that “any significant reductions [to logging] will permanently impair commercial forestry on the Islands, resulting in destruction of the economic base for local communities.”​[32]​ A group of loggers, organizing themselves as the Haida Gwaii Working Forest Action Group, expressed similar concerns while local resource-based business owners expressed fears that they would lose access to their wood supply. To these concerns, Guujaaw responded: “We are going to do our best in negotiations. The last thing we want to see is islanders suffer and big business walk away with more money in their pockets.”​[33]​ 

After more than a year of post-blockade negotiations, the Province released a controversial report which outlined two scenarios for the logging industry based on the two sets of recommendations put forward in the Land Use Recommendations Report. The report concluded that the community’s recommendations presented “a high-risk scenario from a community stability perspective that could exacerbate the economic hardship currently experienced” (Pierce Lefebrve Consulting 2006:7). At the same time, it acknowledged that industry’s recommendations did not have the support of local communities, and thus “would diminish the positive social impacts one would expect to gain” (Ibid.) The Council of the Haida Nation immediately dismissed the report as “so fatally flawed it shouldn’t be released.”​[34]​ 

The opposite conclusion had been reached in a report commissioned the previous year by a coalition of environmental groups. It argued that business-as-usual would result in an inevitable slow decline of the coastal timber industry in a world awash with wood from much cheaper sources. It contended that cutting fewer trees using certified ecosystem-based management practices and processing the wood locally had the potential to increase local job security while ensuring access for coastal timber products to an increasingly ecologically-sensitive world market. Taking into consideration the possibilities for tourism and economic diversification, the report concluded that ecosystem-based management combined with 45 percent protection of Haida Gwaii was a rational economic choice favourable to society’s economic future (Pacific Analytics and Harrison 2004). The findings of this report were in line with community aspirations now being pursued through the Community Viability Strategy. The Island-wide economic development strategy was designed to help communities build a sustainable and diversified future consistent with the community’s recommendations for land use. The anticipated outcome was new opportunities for locals, long-term community stability and a more respectful approach to land and resource use. 

Finally, after nearly three years of post-blockade negotiations, the Haida Gwaii Strategic Land Use Agreement was signed by the Council of the Haida Nation and the province of British Columbia on December 12, 2007. Despite various attempts to thwart it, the new agreement was fully consistent with the Haida Land Use Vision and incorporated a large degree of the community’s recommendations for ecosystem-based management. Under the new agreement, the total area of protected areas and ecosystem-based management reserves on Haida Gwaii encompassed an unprecedented 52 percent of the Islands,​[35]​ while the annual allowable harvest was reduced to 800,000 cubic metres or roughly half of the allowable cut level prior to the blockade. Out of this, 120,000 cubic metres was allocated to the Haida Nation’s Aboriginal forest tenure. 

After decades of resistance, strategic manoeuvring and radical planning by the Haida, environmentalists and allied community members, they have taken back a measure of control over the land and their destinies. Despite the challenges that still lay ahead to make ecosystem-based management and community-based forestry work, and amidst continuing opposition from those with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, Guujaaw remains confident:

The interesting story is yet to come. How do we make this work? How do we create that ecotopian view of the world?  

I think we can do it. I think the world needs these little places to start turning the tide. I think we have a good chance to set an example for the rest of the world.​[36]​

8. Conclusion
 
The signing of the Haida Gwaii Strategic Land Use Agreement represents a significant turning point in resource management and the beginning of a more balanced relationship between the Haida Nation and government of British Columbia. In the end, although the community representatives were restricted in their ability to significantly influence forestry practices within the confines of the official planning process, the process nevertheless served as an important resource to them.

The study highlighted the need for a conflict understanding of power in order to expose the problematic relations of inequality and dominance operating through the planning process. While communicative planning theory emphasises the potential for transforming power relations through the creation of power-neutral, deliberative forums, the study revealed how the consensus-seeking forum was constrained by the broader institutional and political structures which it remained firmly embedded in. These broader legal, administrative and political frameworks, based on and geared toward dominant forms of knowledge, valuing and reasoning, prescribed the limits of deliberation while shaping existing interactions, capacities, and relations of power. These persistent relations of domination limited the potential for alternative knowledge, values and rationality to influence outcomes through the planning process.

At the same time, a consensus understanding of power was useful for understanding how collective power and community capacity was enhanced through the planning process and subsequently directed toward transforming relations of dominance and inequality. The ecosystem-based planning process made an important contribution by providing critical information and analyses on environmental conditions, providing scientific justification for the community’s demands, strengthening relationships and mutual trust between community members, and ultimately helping them to create a shared community vision and concrete recommendations for building a sustainable future. As a result, when a blockade was later launched the Islands’ leadership possessed the intellectual, relational, and cultural capital that enabled them to take full advantage of the possibilities and fortuitous circumstances available to them. Haida negotiators, backed by the community blockade and armed with an assemblage of maps, ecological inventories, analyses, and a collective community vision, were able to reclaim a substantial measure of control over land use decisions and dramatically change the direction of logging and forestry politics on Haida Gwaii. At the same time, the actions leading to this change were given meaning through the background of a broader societal shift in consciousness which allowed the community demands and actions to appear legitimate and correct.
 
Overall, the study showed that collaborative ecosystem-based planning can make a positive contribution toward progressive changes in land use. However, to foster transformative change grassroots actors must ultimately be supported by a coherent grassroots alliance, long-term radical planning and visioning, strong leadership and the capacity for effective collective mobilization.
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^1	  Corresponding author. Present address: POLIS Project on Ecological Governance, University of Victoria, University House 4, PO Box 3060, Victoria, BC, V8W 3R4, Canada. Tel: 1.250.472.5065/ 1.250.382.6729 Fax: 1.250.472.5060.
^2	  A more detailed exposition of the study can be found in Takeda 2008.
^3	  For example, the word “power” is not indexed in Vatn’s comprehensive book on Institutions and the Environment, 2005
^4	  See resource mobilisation theory, e.g. McCarthy and Zald 1977; Edwards and McCarthy 2004.
^5	  Such processes may be referred to as “political renewal” or “political restructuring.”
^6	  See Rajala 2006 for a detailed historical account.
^7	  “First Nations” is the preferred term used by indigenous people in British Columbia and other parts of Canada. The term has a powerful anti-colonial overtone asserting “an organized, political presence that pre-exists European contact while simultaneously placing in question the territorial claims of the Canadian nation-state” (Willems-Braun 1997:26).
^8	  A federal provision in place from 1929 to1951 actually made it illegal for natives to hire lawyers and pursue land title.
^9	  For accounts of the battle for Gwaii Haanas (South Moresby), see Broadhead 1984 and May 1990. For video footage of the logging blockade and interviews with participants, see Jones 2003.
^10	  A park agreement for this area was previously signed in 1988 between the federal and provincial governments. However, the Haida continued to fight for an agreement that acknowledged their rights to the area.  The agreement acknowledges the authority of the Council of the Haida Nation as well as their viewpoint regarding issues of sovereignty, ownership and title.
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